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Abstract: Mereological nihilists hold that composition never occurs, so that
nothing is ever a proper part of anything else. Substance dualists generally
hold that we are each identical with an immaterial soul. In this paper I argue
that every popular objection to substance dualism has a parallel objection
to composition. This thesis has some interesting implications. First, many
of those who reject composition, but accept substance dualism, or who re-
ject substance dualism and accept composition, have some explaining to do.
Second, one popular objection to mereological nihilism, one which contends
that mereological nihilism is objectionable insofar as it is incompatible with
the existence of people, is untenable.
1 Introduction
Mereological nihilism (or just “nihilism”) is the thesis that (mereological)
composition never occurs. So, if nihilism is correct, then there aren’t any
composite objects. Substance dualism, as I will understand the thesis, is
the claim that we are each identical with an immaterial soul. In this paper
I defend, and explore the implications of, the following claim: all of the
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popular arguments against substance dualism can, with minor modifications,
be turned into arguments against composition.
In §2 I describe the parallels between arguments against substance dual-
ism and arguments against composition. In §3 I explore the implications of
this parallelism. There I argue that one implication of the parallelism noted
in §2 is that the following conjunctions of theses are dialectically unstable:
(1) Reject composition and accept substance dualism.
(2) Reject substance dualism and accept composition.
What I mean when I call these conjunctions of theses “dialectically un-
stable” is that, to take (2) as an example, you should probably not reject
substance dualism while accepting composition, insofar as the arguments
which probably convinced you to reject substance dualism can, with minor
modification, be turned into more or less equally effective arguments against
composition. In §3 I also argue that (2) has a further interesting implication,
namely that one popular argument against nihilism is unsuccessful. This ar-
gument, what I’ll call the “composite persons objection” to nihilism, states
that nihilism is false because it has the absurd consequence that we (you, me,
people in general) do not exist. But this objection to nihilism relies on the
presupposition that substance dualism is false, since substance dualism pro-
vides a natural way of reconciling nihilism with the existence of people like
you and me. But if the proponent of the composite persons objection rejects
substance dualism for the standard reasons – that is, for the reasons discussed
in §2 – then they should feel compelled to endorse the parallel objections to
composition. The composite persons objection, then, is unworkable, at least
for many of its proponents – those who endorse the objection to nihilism
must reject substance dualism, but those arguments which tend to convince
these philosophers to reject substance dualism can, with minor modification,
be transformed into arguments for nihilism.
Aside from those implications discussed in §3, you might think the paral-
lels between substance dualism and composition are interesting in their own
right. While I don’t endorse all of the arguments below, the fact that every
major argument against substance dualism finds a parallel argument against
composition should give us pause. After all, substance dualism is widely
regarded as defunct, for the reasons given below. While the case against
substance dualism is, I think, perhaps overblown, let’s assume the consensus
is correct, that there is an overwhelming case to be made against substance
dualism. The upshot of this paper is that, if there is an overwhelming case
to be made against substance dualism, then there may also be a strong case
to be made against composition. Similarly, and surprisingly, there may be a
strong case to be made against any alternative theory of personal ontology
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which identifies us with composite objects. This includes most of the pro-
posed theories of personal ontology, for example those which identify us with
animals, brains, particular (non simple) parts of brains, and four-dimensional
spacetime worms.
2 The Objections
I should emphasize that all of the objections below are sketches. Much
more could be said about all of these objections (both the objections against
dualism, and the parallel objections against composition). I should also
emphasize that I do not endorse all of the objections I am about to discuss.
Perhaps you will think one or more of the objections sketched below are very
bad objections, or rely on premises we know to be false, and I might very
well agree with you.
Above I’ve said that the objections to dualism discussed below can, with
“minor” modification, be transformed into objections to composition. Per-
haps you will not think the modifications required are very minor. The claim
I am most concerned to defend, however, is not that the modifications re-
quired to transform an objection to substance dualism into an objection to
composition are “minor” modifications, or even that the similarities between
the objections to substance dualism and the parallel objections to compo-
sition are very strong. Rather, I am most concerned to establish the claim
that if you accept an objection to dualism discussed below, then you should
accept the parallel objection to composition as well, since those very same
considerations which motivate each objection to dualism also motivate the
parallel objection to composition.
Objection 1: Ontological parsimony.
Ontological parsimony is generally thought to come in two varieties:
quantitative ontological parsimony, and qualitative ontological parsimony.
If either of these sorts of parsimony are taken to be theoretical virtues (in
the sense that a theory which exhibits one or both of these sorts of onto-
logical parsimony is thereby more likely to be true) then either sort of par-
simony provides the resources for an argument against substance dualism.
First, consider quantitative ontological parsimony, according to which a the-
ory displays greater parsimony than one of its competitors if it posits fewer
entities. Substance dualists, by positing immaterial souls in addition to the
various material objects everyone else posits, have more ontological commit-
ments than non-substance dualists. Accordingly, all other things being equal,
if quantitative ontological parsimony is a theoretical virtue, then substance
dualism is, in virtue of its diminished quantitative ontological parsimony, less
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likely to be true than its competitors. Qualitative ontological parsimony is
parsimony with respect to the kinds of things posited by a theory. Substance
dualists posit more kinds of things than most of their competitors, insofar as
substance dualists posit the existence of a kind of thing (immaterial things,
or at any rate immaterial minds or people) which most of their competitors
will not accept (see, e.g. Churchland 1984: 18).1
Both sorts of objections – an objection from quantitative ontological par-
simony, and an objection from qualitative ontological parsimony – can be
made against composite objects. The believer in composite objects posits
the existence of more things than nihilists do, since the believer in composite
objects posits the existence of various composite objects, while the nihilist
does not. Similarly, the believer in composite objects posits the existence of
more kinds of things, namely composite objects (objects with proper parts),
which the nihilist will not posit.2 Accordingly, if quantitative or qualitative
ontological parsimony are theoretical virtues, then nihilism receives some
confirmation from its relative ontological parsimony.3
Note that ontological parsimony, and parsimony more generally, will not
be the only factor one takes into consideration when one tries to decide
whether substance dualism is correct, or whether composition occurs. The
idea isn’t, however, that considerations of ontological parsimony, or parsi-
mony more generally, provide a decisive objection to either substance du-
alism or composition. The idea, rather, is just that their relative lack of
ontological parsimony (or parsimony more generally) provide some grounds
for thinking substance dualism is false, and for thinking non-nihilist theories
are false.
Objection 2: Ideological parsimony.
1An exception being made for theists, and anyone else who already believes in imma-
terial people.
2Objection: While composite objects are “a new kind of thing” (in contrast to simples),
they are not as new, so to speak, as immaterial souls would be. In other words, composite
objects are fairly similar to those things which are already included in the nihilist ontology
(physical simples), while immaterial souls, since they are immaterial, non-located, etc., are
radically different from the material objects included in the typical non-dualist’s ontology.
Response: Some non-substance dualists will also accept immaterial objects of various sorts
(God, numbers, properties, etc.). It is not clear to me, however, how we should judge the
extent to which an ontological kind is similar to some ontological kind we already posit,
and whether this is even relevant to how we assess the extent to which positing a new
ontological kind detracts from the parsimony of our total theory. Why, for example, is
the ontological kind “composite physical object” a smaller departure from the ontological
kind “simple physical object” than “immaterial soul” is from “material object”? Given
this concern, it is difficult to evaluate the strength of this objection.
3Horgan and Potrcˇ (2008) defend nihilism in part on the basis of its ontological parsi-
mony.
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Quine (1951) famously distinguished between a theory’s ontology and its
ideology. Like ontological parsimony, ideological parsimony comes in two
varieties, what we might call quantitative ideological parsimony, and qual-
itative ideological parsimony.4 Let’s assume both sorts of parsimony are
theoretical virtues. A theory exhibits greater quantitative ideological par-
simony if it employs fewer primitives, either primitive predicates, or, more
generally, primitive expressions.5 By contrast, qualitative ideological parsi-
mony is parsimony with respect to kinds of ideological commitments, where,
for example, two or more predicates may be of the same kind if they are inter-
definable. Substance dualism might exhibit less ideological parsimony than
many of its competitors if mental predicates must be taken as primitive (irre-
ducible to non-mental predicates), or if the predicate “immaterial” has to be
taken as primitive. Notably, primitive mental predicates will be employed by
some non-substance dualists, namely property dualists and possibly neutral
monists. Furthermore, the predicate “immaterial” will plausibly not have
to be taken as primitive, as long as the predicate “material” (which every
non-substance dualist other than idealists will have to employ, presumably)
is taken as a primitive.
Ideological parsimony considerations more clearly seem to count against
composition. As Sider (2013) has recently argued, nihilists can do with-
out mereological primitives (for example, the two place parthood relation).
This is a point in favor of nihilism’s quantitative and qualitative ideological
parsimony.6 Some philosophers argue that nihilism does not enjoy greater
ideological parsimony than its competitors, since nihilists will need to employ
new predicates like “arranged table-wise” (see, for example, Bennett 2009;
Tallant 2014). But that’s not right, since the sorts of arrangement predi-
cates employed by the nihilist are also employed by the non-nihilist. After
all, some simples will compose a table, for example, precisely because they
are arranged table-wise. There’s more to be said on this subject (see Brenner
2015a). For now it is enough to note that the nihilist has a prima facie plau-
sible case to make that her view enjoys greater ideological parsimony than
its competitors.
4Qualitative ideological parsimony was brought to philosophers’ attention in Cowling
2013.
5E.g. logical connectives, quantifier meanings, operators, etc. This broad conception
of ideology, which goes beyond just the predicates employed by a theory, is defended in
Sider 2011.
6This latter point is true only assuming that parthood (or any other two place mereo-
logical primitive – proper parthood, overlap, etc.) is not of the same ideological kind as
some ideological commitment which nihilists already accept. Cowling (2013: §8) argues
that parthood and identity are of the same ideological kind. I think Cowling’s incorrect,
but I don’t have the space here to consider his arguments.
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Objection 3: Law parsimony.
One respect in which a theory can be more or less parsimonious is with
respect to the laws posited by the theory, both the number of laws posited
by the theory, and the complexity of those laws (I don’t have the space here
to work out precisely what it would amount to for a law to be more or less
complex, but we can leave it at an intuitive level). One argument against
both property and substance dualism (going back at least to Smart 1959) is
that dualists will need to posit fundamental psycho-physical laws correlating
physical brain states with mental states. Insofar as the dualist must posit
such laws, while the non-dualist does not, dualism is less parsimonious than
its rivals. That’s a strike against dualism.
Those who believe in composition will have to posit fundamental mereo-
logical laws, or, if you’re not comfortable calling them “laws,” fundamental
principles regarding the manner in which composition works.7 These in-
clude, for example, whether or not the weak supplementation principle is
(non vacuously) true, whether two composite objects can share all of the
same proper parts, as well as, crucially, supervenience and explanatory re-
lations between the properties of wholes and the properties of their proper
parts (what van Inwagen calls “principles of composition” – van Inwagen
1990: 43). The supervenience relationship between wholes and their proper
parts is generally taken for granted – isn’t it just obvious, for example, that
a whole would be located where its proper parts are located? On reflection,
however, it should be seen as somewhat odd that the properties of this ob-
ject (some whole) and the properties of those objects (the proper parts) are
correlated in some respects, but not others. After all, contra proponents of
composition as identity, wholes are distinct objects from their proper parts
(taken individually or collectively), and widespread and systematic superve-
nience relationships between distinct objects cry out for explanation. Some
philosophers (e.g. Cameron 2014) have admitted that the supervenience re-
lationships between parts and wholes are brute. In any case, if you believe in
composition, and you (like almost every other person who believes in com-
position) think that the properties of some wholes are correlated with the
properties of their proper parts, then you’ll need to posit fundamental laws
governing the relationship between wholes and their parts. Insofar as the
believer in composition needs to posit such laws, while the nihilist does not,
7Whether we call them “laws” or “principles” seems to me to be a superficial matter
regarding how we use our words, and I only note the distinction here because some readers
of this paper have been uncomfortable calling the principles in question “laws.” The
important point to note is that the mereological laws or principles are objectionable (if they
are objectionable) for precisely the reason psycho-physical laws would be objectionable,
namely insofar as they increase the complexity of our total theory.
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nihilism is more parsimonious than its competitors, and so is more likely to
be true.8
It may be objected at this point that the sorts of mereological laws posited
by the believer in composition are necessary, while the psycho-physical laws
posited by the dualist are contingent, and this gives us some reason to think
the law parsimony objection to dualism is a more powerful objection than
the similar objection to composition.9 There are several problems with this
objection. First, there seem to me to be no very compelling grounds for
thinking mereological laws will all be necessary, or for that matter that the
dualist’s psycho-physical laws need be contingent. Second, it is unclear why
contingent laws would count against a theory’s parsimony more than neces-
sary laws. If the dualist stipulated that his laws were necessary would that do
anything to assuage our concern that those laws are unparsimonious? More
generally, if we’re concerned that some theoretical posit is unparsimonious,
would it help assuage our concerns if the proponents of those theoretical
posits stipulated that they are necessary rather than contingent? I think the
answer to both these questions is “no.” Both the dualist and the non-nihilist
have to posit, for example, seemingly brute correlations between distinct ob-
jects (souls and bodies, parts and wholes), and insofar as they have to posit
such laws it seems as if those of us who do not need to posit such mysteri-
ous and seemingly inexplicable correlations thereby make do with a simpler
picture of the world. Whether the correlations posited by the dualist or non-
nihilist are necessary or contingent seems to me to have nothing much to do
with the fact that those of us who do not need to posit such correlations
thereby have a simpler world view.
Objection 4: Causal closure/exclusion.
A popular argument against (interactionist versions of) substance dualism
is based on the alleged causal closure of the physical world, or (another way
of putting it) the exclusion of immaterial minds’ causal influence from the
physical world (see e.g. Kim 2005). If (interactionist) substance dualism is
correct, then immaterial minds sometimes causally influence physical events.
But every physical event which has a sufficient cause has a sufficient physical
cause. So, barring overdetermination, immaterial minds never interact with
physical events, and so (interactionist) substance dualism is false.
The parallel argument against composite objects is fairly well known, as
a variant of that argument was defended in an influential book by Merricks
8Elsewhere (Brenner 2015b) I defend nihilism in part on the basis of the fact that
nihilism is more parsimonious than its rivals insofar as it does not require that we posit
mereological laws.
9Thanks to Chad Marxen for this objection.
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(2003).10 The idea is that the causal closure of the physical is no more
plausible than the causal closure of the microphysical. In other words, every
physical event which has a sufficient cause has a sufficient microphysical – and
in particular, mereologically simple – cause. So, any causal contribution made
by a composite object would be overdetermined by the causal contributions
of its mereologically simple proper parts. The classic example is that of
a baseball breaking a window. If the baseball moving in such-and-such a
direction, with such-and-such a velocity relative to the window, is sufficient to
break the window, then the mereologically simple constituents of the baseball,
moving in such-and-such a direction, with such-and-such a velocity relative to
the window, is sufficient to break the window. So, barring overdetermination,
the baseball does not break the window. If these were good grounds to
eliminate souls from our ontology, then they should also be good grounds to
eliminate composite objects from our ontology. In fact, if composite objects
are epiphenomena, we might have better grounds to eliminate them from our
ontology than to eliminate epiphenomenal souls from our ontology. After all,
if composite objects are epiphenomena, then it is difficult to see how we could
ever learn of their existence via straightforward perceptual evidence, and such
evidence is, I suspect, behind many people’s insistence that composite objects
exist (“I can just see my dog!”) (cf. Dorr 2002: 65).
Merricks, of course, thinks some composite objects engage in causal rela-
tions which are not overdetermined by their proper parts. Perhaps Merricks
is correct. But note that if this aspect of Merrick’s view has any plausibility,
it is unclear why the substance dualist should not be able to make a simi-
lar point, and argue that some immaterial objects (namely, souls) engage in
causal relations which are not overdetermined by any physical causes.
Objection 5: No interaction between physical and non-physical; The pairing
problem.
One popular objection to dualism is based on the alleged difficulty in-
volved in an immaterial thing (a soul) engaging in causal interaction with a
physical thing (the body associated with a soul). Here’s how Paul Church-
land puts it:
If ‘mind-stuff’ is so utterly different from ‘matter-stuff’ in its na-
ture – different to the point that it has no mass whatever, no
shape whatever, and no position anywhere in space – then how is
10I don’t make any effort to follow the precise manner in which Merricks presents the
problem for composition. Dorr (2002: Ch.2) also gives this sort of argument against the
existence of composite objects. While Merricks take his argument to count against the
existence of most, but not all, composite objects, Dorr takes his argument to count in
favor of full blown nihilism.
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it possible for my mind to have any causal influence on my body
at all? ... How is this utterly insubstantial ‘thinking substance’
to have any influence on ponderous matter? How can two such
different things be in any sort of causal contact? (Churchland
1984: 8-9)
As it stands, this isn’t really an argument. (As Churchland notes later in
his book (in a different context) “Rhetorical questions ... do not constitute
arguments” (Churchland 1984: 16).) The most prominent attempt to make
the challenge for substance dualism more concrete is Jaegwon Kim’s “pairing
problem” (see in particular Kim 2005: Ch. 3). Jim and Bob are both
immaterial souls. Jim causes events in Jim’s body, but not Bob’s body. Why
is that the case? This question is particularly pressing if we suppose that
Jim and Bob are intrinsic duplicates – they both will, for example, that Jim’s
body raise its right hand. Why is it the case that Jim’s intention to raise
his right hand is causally efficacious, that it actually results in Jim’s body
raising its right hand, while Bob’s intention is not causally efficacious? More
generally, why is it the case Jim regularly causes changes in Jim’s body, Bob
regularly causes changes in Bob’s body, and not vice-versa? What feature of
the situation makes it the case that Jim is causally paired with Jim’s body,
rather than some other physical object?
These are still, of course, just rhetorical questions, but on reflection it
may appear that the substance dualist can give no satisfying answer to these
questions. When the relata of some causal relation are both spatially located
we can say why they are causally related to one another – it is Jim’s body
which pets the dog, rather than Bob’s body which pets the dog, because
Jim’s hand (a part of his body) is spatially contiguous (more or less) with
the dog, while Bob’s body is not. We can’t tell any similar story about the
causal relation between Jim and Jim’s body, since Jim, being an immaterial
soul, is not spatially located.
One way to ensure that Jim causes events in Jim’s body, but not any
other physical objects, is to posit some sort of primitive pairing relation
between Jim and his body. This “solution” to the causal pairing problem
effectively denies a metaphysical principle Kim tacitly employs, according to
which causal relations can’t be primitive, that there has to be some non-
causal relation between causal relata which “pairs” the relata.
Even if we grant that causal relations don’t need to be “paired” in the
manner suggested by Kim, is positing a primitive pairing relation between
souls and bodies really such a good idea? It seems to leave us with a more
general pairing problem: why is this Jim’s body, rather than, say, Bob’s
body? Why does the primitive pairing relation hold between Jim and Jim’s
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body, rather than some other body? It’s unsatisfying (we can suppose) that
this soul would be associated with this body by mere chance, for no reason
at all. One proposed solution to the problem (defended by Swinburne 1986:
198-199) is that souls are associated with their respective bodies because
God decrees that they are associated with one another. Another solution is
that souls are spatially located (Hasker 1999). This might provide a solution
to the pairing problem, since we could say that this soul is associated with
this body because it is located where this body (or some part of this body)
is located. Or perhaps this soul is associated with this body because it is
the activities of this body which give rise to, ground, or create this soul (cf.
Bailey et. al. 2011: 353).
There is an analogous problem for composition: why is this whole asso-
ciated with these parts?11 Why is it the case that these parts compose this
table, rather than some other qualitatively identical table? These questions
are particularly pressing for those who believe that some objects can com-
pose some composite object at one time, and those very objects can compose
an entirely different composite object at some other time.12 Again, it would
be unsatisfying if there was no explanation at all for the association. Any
solution open to the dualist is also available to the believer in composition:
perhaps God decides which wholes are associated with which parts, or per-
haps wholes are associated with their parts because they are located where
those parts are located, or perhaps this whole is associated with these parts
because these are the parts which give rise to, ground, or create this whole.
If any of these solutions to the mereological pairing problem work, then pre-
sumably the analogous solutions with respect to the dualist pairing problem
should work as well.
I suspect that some readers will think the natural and obvious response
to the mereological pairing problem is that parts are associated with their
respective whole because they are located within the region in which the
whole is located.13 This response will perhaps be considered so obvious
that the mereological pairing problem will not be seen as a “problem” at
all. Allow me to make two observations, intended to underscore the fact
that this proposed solution to the mereological pairing problem is not as
obviously correct as its proponents might assume. First, if we say that parts
are associated with their wholes because they are located within the region
occupied by their wholes, then we will rule out as impossible certain sorts of
constitution. Some philosophers have wanted to say, for example, that some
11This “mereological pairing problem” was introduced in Brenner 2015b.
12Just as the analogous pairing problem for dualism might be particularly acute for
substance dualists who believe in reincarnation.
13Thanks here to an anonymous referee.
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object A is located within the region occupied by composite objects B and
C, and while A is a part of B, it is not a part of C. Think, for example, of a
statue which is colocated (and constituted by) a lump of clay: the arm of the
statue (say) may be part of the statue, but not part of the lump, despite the
fact that it is located within the region occupied by both the statue and the
lump. A second point to note is that if we answer the mereological pairing
problem by saying that some parts are associated with their whole because
they are located within the region occupied by the whole, then we will simply
have traded one demand for explanation (why are these parts associated with
these wholes?) with another (why are parts always locate within the region
occupied by their wholes?).
You might think the pairing problem for dualism is more serious than
the pairing problem for composition, for the following reason: souls can exist
without their bodies, but wholes cannot exist without their parts.14 I have
several responses to this concern. First, it does not seem as if it does anything
to undermine the worry behind the pairing problem, namely that you will
have to posit some sort of mysterious or otherwise objectionable primitive
pairing relation between souls and bodies, or wholes and parts. Whether
wholes must have parts if they are to exist, or even whether wholes must
have some particular parts if they are to exist, does nothing to undermine the
suspicion that there is an explanatory burden which must be met to explain
why this whole is associated (perhaps essentially) with these parts. Leaving
that point aside, however, I would also question the assumption that wholes
must invariably have (proper) parts in order to exist.15 If wholes must have
parts in order to exist, then wholes are wholes essentially. But I don’t see
any motivation for thinking wholes are wholes essentially. Conversely, if we
suppose that wholes are wholes essentially, we should also feel free to suppose
that souls are essentially such that they have some body or other. Some
substance dualists (e.g. Hasker 1999), for example, see souls as “emerging”
from their respective brains. Such dualists might very well think that souls
can exist only if they remain associated with some brain or other.
I’ll end my discussion of the pairing problem by briefly noting a second
pairing problem for some believers in composite objects, one which regards
the causal relations entered into by mereologically coincident objects. Some
philosophers (e.g. Baker 2000) think there are composite objects which are
such that one constitutes the other. Think, for example, of the statue and
the lump of material which composes the statue. If mereologically coincident
14Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting I address this worry.
15Everything is trivially a part of itself, so it is true that any particular thing must have
at least one part (itself) if it is to exist. So, what we’re really wondering about here is
whether wholes must have proper parts in order to exist.
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objects can exhibit different causal powers (as Baker believes), then, since
they are colocated with one another, we’ll be left with a causal pairing prob-
lem: why is it the case that this object caused this effect, while the object
with which it is colocated, which exhibits the same spatio-temporal relation
with the effect, did not cause that effect?16
Objection 6: Conservation laws.
One concern regarding interactionist variants of substance dualism is
whether such views are compatible with conservation laws (e.g. mass/energy
conservation, linear-momentum conservation). Let’s focus on conservation of
mass/energy.17 In particular, if a soul causes some event in the brain (per-
haps, for example, the movement of my arm) wouldn’t this involve some sort
of transfer of energy to the brain, and wouldn’t that result in a violation of
relevant conservation laws? Here’s how Dennett puts the worry:
No physical energy or mass is associated with [souls]. How, then,
do they get to make a difference to what happens in the brain
cells they must affect, if the mind is to have any influence over the
body? A fundamental principle of physics is that any change in
the trajectory of any physical entity is an acceleration requiring
the expenditure of energy, and where is this energy to come from?
... This confrontation between quite standard physics and dual-
ism has been endlessly discussed since Descartes’s own day, and
is widely regarded as the inescapable and fatal flaw of dualism
(Dennett 1991: 35)18
Do conservation laws have any implications for what we should think
about composite objects? Maybe. Consider theories according to which
composite physical objects come into existence. On these views new physical
composite objects come into existence, objects with mass, volume, etc. In
such cases we have no reason to believe some corresponding amount of mass
was destroyed. Why then wouldn’t the total mass of a physical system in
which a new composite object is included increase? Here’s an example. Let’s
say you have n simples, the total mass of which is, in some particular frame
of reference (I’ll suppress this detail from now on), 10kg. You put the simples
16The similarity between Kim’s pairing problem and the analogous pairing problem for
mereologically coincident objects is noted by Bennett (2007: 321) and Bailey et. al. (2011:
351-352).
17For a discussion of conservation of momentum, and whether such conservation laws
would pose a problem for interactionist dualism, see Averill, Keating 1981.
18See Montero 2006: 384-385 for an extensive list of philosophers who argue against
interactionist dualism on the basis of conservation laws.
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together in such a manner that they begin to compose a table, a table which
will presumably have a mass of 10kg. Since the table is not identical with
the simples of which it is composed,19 after we form the table we should
presumably have objects whose mass totals 20kg: the 10kg of simples, plus
the 10kg table. But clearly enough, at the end of the process we only have
objects whose total mass equals 10kg. What gives?
Here is a concern which you might, but shouldn’t, have. When I suggest
that we should expect to have objects whose total mass measures 20kg after
the simples compose the table, I am double counting : we measure the mass of
the proper parts twice, first when we measure the mass of the proper parts,
and then again when we measure the mass of the whole.20 In response I’d
note that we do not measure the mass of the proper parts twice. When we
measure the mass of the whole we are measuring the mass of the whole, not
its proper parts, objects which are distinct from the whole. Of course, given
the appropriate sorts of mereological laws or principles of composition, you
might think the mass of the whole is determined by the mass of the proper
parts. That may very well be true, but it wouldn’t show that in measuring
the mass of the whole and in measuring the mass of the proper parts we’ve
measured the mass of the proper parts twice. Consider an analogy: My
parents ensure that I get just as many pieces of candy as my brother gets.
So, assuming my brother receives his candy first, then the number of pieces
of candy which I get is determined by the number of pieces which my brother
gets. It would not follow that you would be double counting if you counted
my pieces and then counted my brother’s pieces. After all, my pieces of
candy are distinct objects from my brother’s pieces of candy, despite the fact
that the number of pieces I have is determined by the number of pieces my
brother has, and so despite the fact that, in measuring my pieces, you can
easily determine how many pieces my brother has. Similarly, insofar as a
whole and its proper parts are distinct objects, in measuring the mass of a
whole you do not thereby automatically measure the mass of its proper parts,
even if by measuring the mass of the whole you can determine the mass of
the proper parts.
I suspect this problem for composition will not be taken very seriously
by many people, but I’m not sure why. Composition (physical composition,
anyway) results in new physical objects, with non-zero masses. That should,
prima facie, violate the conservation of mass/energy, and yet transparently
that conservation law does not appear to be violated in cases of purported
19I assume throughout that composition as identity, according to which composite ob-
jects are identical with their parts, is false.
20Thanks to Chad Marxen for this objection.
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composition. There are two obvious responses to this concern: either compo-
sition doesn’t occur after all, or you can create a new massive physical object,
without removing or decreasing the mass of any other physical objects, with-
out increasing the total mass of the total system of physical objects. The
latter principle could legitimately be seen as an ad hoc emendation of the rel-
evant conservation law. (And, as long as we’re making ad hoc modifications
to conservation laws, why couldn’t the dualist make that move?)
Something like the problem I’ve just pressed for those who believe in
composition has been discussed before in debates over constitution. Recall
the lump which is alleged to constitute a statue. If the lump has a mass
of 10kg, and the statue has a mass of 10kg, and the lump is not identical
with the statue, then why is it the case that when we put the lump and
statue on a scale the scale doesn’t measure 20kg (see, for example, Lewis
1986: 252)? Interestingly, Thomson (1998: 170, n.5) defends constitution
from this sort of objection on the grounds that, if we wonder why the lump
and statue don’t collectively have a mass of 20kg, then we should also be
led to wonder why the statue and any of its proper parts do not collectively
have a mass which is the sum of the mass of the statue and the mass of that
proper part. Thomson assumes the latter puzzle regarding the relationship
between the mass of a composite object and the masses of its proper parts
is unproblematic, but that is precisely the assumption which I’ve challenged
above.
Objection 7: Mental properties supervene on physical properties in brains, so
this is evidence that physical properties of brains are all there are.
A very popular objection to substance dualism is something like the fol-
lowing. We know that mental properties are supervenient upon physical
brain states. What explains this supervenience relationship? The physical-
ist’s response to this question is that mental states supervene on physical
brain states because mental states just are physical brain states. Once we’ve
got those physical brain states we don’t have any reason to posit any further
properties (irreducible mental properties) or substances (souls).
Sometimes proponents of this sort of objection to dualism write as if the
dualist does not think that mental properties supervene on physical brain
states (see e.g. Churchland 1984: 20). But that wouldn’t be a very solid
foundation for an objection to dualism, since dualists (obviously) can and
do recognize widespread and systematic supervenience relationships between
mental states and physical brain states. A better way to put the objection
to dualism is that physicalism is a particularly elegant, but defeasible, ex-
planation of the widespread and systematic supervenience between mental
states and physical brain states. Alternatively, the objection might be put
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in probabilistic terms. Physicalism predicts that mental states will super-
vene on physical brain states, insofar as physicalism predicts that mental
states are physical brain states. Dualism, by contrast, is compatible with
mental states supervening on physical brain states, but does not entail that
they do so. Accordingly, our evidence E (systematic supervenience of men-
tal states on physical brain states) is more probable given the hypothesis
P that physicalism is true than given the hypothesis D that dualism is true
(Pr(E/P)>Pr(E/D)). So, since physicalism is incompatible with dualism, the
widespread systematic supervenience of mental states on physical brain states
raises the probability of physicalism vs dualism.
Analogous points can be made with respect to composite objects. Prop-
erties of (alleged) wholes supervene on the properties of their proper parts.
So, why posit the whole in addition to the parts? Once we’ve got the parts,
why should we go any further and posit wholes which are associated with
those parts? Put another way, given that the properties of whatever are in
this region supervene on the properties of the simples in this region, a partic-
ularly elegant explanation of that supervenience is that the region in question
only contains the simples. Put in probabilistic terms, nihilism predicts that
the properties of whatever is in this region will supervene on the properties
of the simples in this region, while by contrast if we reject nihilism there is
no guarantee that the properties of whatever is in this region will supervene
on the properties of the simples in this region. So, the systematic superve-
nience of the properties of whatever is in this region on the properties of the
simples in this region provides evidence in favor of nihilism, since nihilism
predicts that supervenience better than the negation of nihilism. If the for-
mer objection(s) to dualism works, then the exactly analogous objection(s)
to composition should work as well (and vice versa).
You may be tempted to make the following response: the properties of
whatever is in this region supervene on the simples in this region because
the simples in this region are parts of whatever composite objects are in
this region.21 But this response is only tenable if we posit laws governing
the manner in which the properties of wholes supervene on the properties of
their proper parts. The dualist can make the same move, saying that the
properties of souls supervene on the properties of brains in certain respects
because of psycho-physical laws.
Objection 8: Evolutionary debunking.
There is mounting evidence which suggests that humans are naturally
disposed to be mind/body dualists (cf. Bloom 2004; Bering, Bjorklund 2004;
Hood, et. al. 2012; Forstmann, Burgmer 2015). So, it seems as if we might
21Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting I address this response.
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have built-in cognitive faculties which dispose us toward dualism. If we have
no reason to think such cognitive mechanisms are reliable, then we might
have the resources to develop an evolutionary debunking argument against
dualism, of the sort which has recently received a great deal of attention in
meta-ethics (see e.g. Street 2006; Joyce 2006).22 Any plausible argument
of this sort would not, I think, actually show that dualism lacks epistemic
justification. It might, however, undermine particular sources of justification
for dualism (cf. Jong, Visala 2014), insofar as it might show that the sorts
of intuitions which underlie arguments for dualism are of dubious reliability.
These include, for example, the sorts of modal intuitions which underlie
conceivability arguments for substance dualism (in e.g. Swinburne 1986:
Ch.8; Plantinga 2006).
Similar points can be made with respect to our belief in composite ob-
jects. There is little doubt that humans have an innate tendency to believe
in composite objects (for details, see Osborne 2016). Is there any reason to
think those cognitive faculties by which we acquire such beliefs are reliable?
Plausibly not, insofar as a world in which there are no composites will ar-
guably be empirically identical to one in which there are composite objects,
or at the very least empirically identical with respect to those situations we
can expect our evolutionary predecessors to have encountered. There is no
reason, then, to think there would have been any evolutionary pressure to-
ward our forming or retaining reliable cognitive faculties by which we form
the belief that there are composite objects. So, insofar as our belief in com-
posite objects is the result of cognitive faculties which we have no reason
to believe are reliable, we have reason to withdraw those beliefs. And it’s
interesting to note that almost without exception philosophers defend belief
in composition on the basis of intuition and perception – those very cognitive
faculties which we have no reason to think are reliable with respect to this
subject matter (that is, with respect to whether or not there are composite
objects in any particular vicinity, rather than merely simples arranged in
some particular manner).
Objection 9: Where do souls come from?
One challenge for substance dualists is to explain where souls come from.23
Presumably the souls which exist now haven’t always existed. So, by what
causal mechanism did they come to exist? A more specific way of putting
the worry is in terms of our evolutionary history. Presumably at some point
in our evolutionary history there weren’t any souls, but now there are. As-
suming it can’t be a vague matter whether souls exist or are associated with
22For a more general discussion of evolutionary debunking arguments, see Kahane 2011.
23For a recent discussion of this subject see Farris 2014.
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particular bodies, then at some point there was a sharp cut off – before that
point there were no souls, but after that point there were. So, by what casual
mechanism was that gap bridged? And is it really so plausible to suppose
there would be any sharp cut off point of this sort, when our evolutionary
history was a very gradual sort of process?
Admittedly, it’s difficult to turn these worries into any sort of argument
against dualism. Still, you might think it is implausible that there could be
sharp cut off points, in the history of individual organisms or in the history
of life more generally, before which there is no soul, and after which there is
a soul. So, if the dualist is committed to such cut off points, then she’s in
trouble. More generally, you might think it’s very mysterious that new souls
come into existence when new organisms (or human organisms specifically)
come into existence. Assuming that we understand the sorts of biological
processes involved in the creation of a new organism, why should any of that
result in a new immaterial soul? The creation of a new soul in this sort of
situation seems utterly inexplicable.
A similar challenge is faced by many of those who believe in composition:
where do composite objects come from? In particular, non-universalists will
have to embrace sharp cut off points, precise configurations of matter (for
example) which are such that before that configuration is in place there is
no composite object, but after that configuration is in place there is. This is
assuming, of course, that it cannot be vague whether some composite object
exists in some particular situation. But such vagueness is widely regarded
as implausible, insofar as it plausibly leads to vagueness with respect to how
many objects there are.24 Leaving aside the concern about cut off points,
you might think the generation of new physical composite objects is very
mysterious. For example, most people who believe in composite objects
apparently think I can create a brand new large physical object, one so
heavy I can’t even carry it, just by moving other objects around. I take
some pieces of wood and I move them around, and I nail them together. I’ve
made a table. Suddenly a large physical object, one which hasn’t existed
until this moment, stands before me. Why did that happen? How did I
make a whole new large heavy physical object just by moving some other
objects around and putting nails in them? This seems utterly inexplicable,
maybe even magical.
For what it’s worth, perhaps neither objection (the objection to dualism
or the parallel objection to composition) is particularly compelling. Where do
24But for one (kind of weird) way to try to avoid the conclusion that vagueness with
respect to when composition occurs will lead to vagueness with respect to how many
objects exist, see Carmichael 2011.
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composite objects come from? Presumably, the answer will be that they show
up when some mereological simples exhibit certain properties (for example,
when they’re arranged in a certain manner). We could say something similar
about souls – they show up when the bodies with which they are associated
instantiate certain properties (for example, when they develop brains of a
certain configuration). In both cases we’ll need laws governing the creation of
the new objects in question, i.e., laws of the form “when such-and-such sorts
of simples instantiate such-and-such a property then they begin to compose
a table.”
In any case, it seems to me that if this is a challenge for substance dualists,
it’s a challenge for those who believe in composition as well, and vice versa.
We only have a distinctive problem for substance dualism if the difficulty is
really the purported difficulty of making sense of causal interaction between
physical things and non-physical things (e.g. a physical thing causing a soul
to come into existence). But that’s a different objection.
3 Implications
I’ve argued that all of the popular arguments against substance dualism have
parallel arguments against composition. What’s more, I have argued that if
you accept any of these arguments against substance dualism then you should
accept the parallel argument against composition. In the course of setting
out all of the popular arguments against substance dualism I have, coinci-
dentally, presented all of the most popular arguments against composition
(as well as some unpopular or entirely novel arguments against composition).
So, I have in effect argued that all of the most popular arguments against
composition have parallel arguments against substance dualism. And while
I have been mostly concerned to establish the claim that if you accept any
of the arguments against substance dualism discussed above then you should
accept the parallel argument against composition, I think the converse claim
is plausible as well: if you accept any of the arguments against composi-
tion discussed above, then you should accept the parallel argument against
substance dualism.
These theses, if correct, should be of intrinsic interest. However, they also
have important implications for how we evaluate both mereological nihilism
and substance dualism, and in this section I’ll explore what those implica-
tions might be. There are at least two major implications of these theses
which I will explore here. First, that those who reject substance dualism
may have reason to reject composition (and vice versa). Second, that one
major objection to nihilism, what I call the “composite persons objection”
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to nihilism, is unsuccessful. I’ll discuss each of these subjects in turn.
It may seem as if it is a small step from “if you accept one of these pop-
ular arguments against substance dualism then you should accept a parallel
argument against composition (and vice versa)” to “if you reject substance
dualism then you should reject composition (and vice versa).” But this isn’t
so obvious. For starters, you might reject substance dualism, or reject com-
position, for some unconventional reason which I haven’t discussed. Or, you
might think it is obvious or otherwise probable that composition occurs. Ac-
cordingly, you will put little if any stock in the objections to composition
which I’ve discussed above. If this is your view, then perhaps this paper will
lead you to put little stock in the parallel objections to dualism, now that
you’ve seen how all of the objections to composition which I’ve discussed
above can, with little modification, be turned into objections to dualism.
Another prima facie reasonable response to this paper is to note that, since
you already find one or more of the popular objections to dualism convinc-
ing, you will find the parallel objection(s) to composition convincing as well.
Accordingly, you will lower the epistemic probability you accord to the view
that composition occurs. Or, perhaps the objections discussed above will
lead you to place less credence in the disjunction of dualism and the view
that composition occurs.25
In any case, an important take away is that, surprisingly, how one eval-
uates substance dualism will have major implications for how one evaluates
nihilism, and conversely how one evaluates nihilism will have major impli-
cations for how one evaluates substance dualism. At least for many people,
the following conjunctions of views may be dialectically unstable:
(1) Reject composition and accept substance dualism.
(2) Reject substance dualism and accept composition.
Note that I am not making the strong claim that if, e.g., nihilism is true,
then substance dualism is false. There isn’t a straightforward entailment
relation, in either direction, between the former thesis (nihilism is true) and
the latter thesis (substance dualism is false). Rather, I am making the weaker
claim that if, say, you accept nihilism, and also accept substance dualism,
then you have some explaining to do. In particular you will have to answer the
challenge “if you reject composition on the basis of such-and-such arguments,
why don’t parallel arguments lead you to reject substance dualism?”
That (2) may represent an unstable conjunction of views seems to me to
have a particularly noteworthy implication, namely that it undermines what
I will call the “composite persons objection to nihilism” (or just the CPO).
25Thanks here to Liz Jackson.
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Here’s how van Inwagen puts the CPO: “... Nihilism would appear to be
false, for you and I exist and we are composite objects” (van Inwagen 1990:
73).26
This is, I think, the most powerful objection which has so far been raised
against nihilism, but it is one which nihilists have not taken very seriously.
For example, in Sider’s recent defense of nihilism (Sider 2013) he devotes 43
pages to responding to objections to nihilism, but only one of those pages is
about the CPO. Other nihilists are similarly brief in their responses to the
argument.27 The response given by Sider and others is, more or less, that
we don’t exist, and that phenomenal states are collectively instantiated by
whatever simples are commonly thought to compose us or our brains. I don’t
think this response is very satisfying. Many of us are rightly skeptical of the
notion that we don’t exist, so it would be worthwhile if the nihilist had an
alternative response to the CPO.
There is a fairly obvious response for the nihilist to make: If I exist, and,
as nihilists contend, composition never occurs, then I must be something
other than a composite object. There are several options here. Perhaps I am
some (non-composite) stuff, or an arrangement of simples/stuff (Goldwater
2015), or I am a simple. The last option, in the form of a variant of substance
dualism according to which I am a mereologically simple non-physical object,
has historically been quite popular. Many philosophers seem to suppose that
if nihilism is true, and we exist, then some sort of substance dualism must
be correct, since it gives us the only plausible way to respond to the CPO.
Unfortunately for the nihilist, substance dualism is not very popular
among philosophers today. It is this fact which provides the key to a novel re-
sponse to the CPO, since, as I’ve argued above, all of the popular arguments
against substance dualism can, with minor modifications, be transformed
into arguments against composition. Some people reject nihilism because
they reject substance dualism, and think nihilists need to be committed to
substance dualism in order to get around the CPO. One upshot of this paper
is that you should probably not endorse that line of thought – you should
probably not reject nihilism because you reject substance dualism. Put an-
other way, the CPO (the conclusion of which is that nihilism is false) relies
on the presupposition that substance dualism is false. But all of the pop-
ular arguments for that presupposition can, with only minor modifications,
be transformed into arguments against the conclusion of the CPO. So, you
shouldn’t endorse the CPO (unless, of course, you reject substance dualism
26Other philosophers who give this sort of objection to nihilism include Markosian 1998;
Hudson 2001: Ch.1; Olson 2007: Ch.9; Gilmore ms.
27For example, Dorr and Rosen 2002 also devote about a page to the CPO.
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for some reason other than one of the reasons discussed above). At the very
least I’m shifting the burden of proof to those who reject nihilism because
they reject substance dualism: If you reject substance dualism, why don’t
your arguments against substance dualism (with minor modifications) also
imply that composition never occurs?
I’ll end my discussion of the CPO with a list of some of the philosophers
I have in mind here – that is, philosophers who rejects nihilism because they
reject substance dualism. Hud Hudson considers the “Problem of the Many,”
a puzzle regarding composition which I don’t need to describe in too much
detail in order to get my point across. The Problem of the Many aims to
show that we run into trouble if we follow our pre-theoretic beliefs regarding
which sorts of relatively large composite objects exist. One way out of the
difficulty, one which the nihilist is happy to accept, is to deny the existence of
the composite objects which cause the trouble. Hudson says we should reject
this solution to the Problem of the Many because it would entail that we
don’t exist, since we’re relatively large composite objects if we exist (Hudson
2001: 17-18). Hudson quickly concedes that substance dualists can avoid
quantifying over large-ish composite objects, without resorting to the view
that we don’t exist (Hudson 2001: 19-21). Unfortunately for the would-be
dualist, her solution to the Problem of the Many runs into its own problems,
chief among them being the “traditional objections to Dualism” (Hudson
2001: 21). Hudson does not tell us what these “traditional objections to
Dualism” are, but if I had to guess he had in mind some of the arguments I
discuss above. So, Hudson advocates the theoretical position which I suggest
in this paper is unstable: he advocates that we reject nihilism because, bar-
ring her adoption of the particularly implausible view that we don’t exist,
the nihilist will have to be a substance dualist, and he advocates that we
reject substance dualism because of the “traditional objections.” This view
is unstable because those “traditional objections” can, with little modifica-
tion, be turned into arguments in favor of nihilism. Ned Markosian (to give
another example) is in a similar predicament. Markosian tells us that one of
the serious difficulties facing nihilism is that nihilism would entail that we
don’t exist, since we “are surely physical objects composed of many parts,
if we exist at all” (Markosian 1998: 220). He concedes that one way out of
the difficulty would be to accept substance dualism, but substance dualism
is “unacceptable” (Markosian 1998: 245, Note 23). Markosian does not tell
us why substance dualism is unacceptable, but it would be unsurprising if he
rejects substance dualism because of one or more of the popular objections
to dualism discussed above. To give one final example, Cody Gilmore (ms)
has developed a version of the CPO which includes as a premise “If I have
being, then I am composite.” Gilmore recognizes that substance dualism is
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incompatible with this premise, but says that we should reject substance du-
alism because “we have (partly empirical) grounds for denying that there are
souls or other concrete non-physical entities.” Gilmore does not elaborate,
but I assume that the objections to substance dualism which he has in mind
are some or all of those objections which I discuss in §2.
4 Conclusion
I don’t pretend that I’ve surveyed every prima facie plausible argument
against substance dualism, or every prima facie plausible argument against
composition. I have, I think, surveyed all of the most popular arguments
against substance dualism and composition. I’ve shown that how one evalu-
ates substance dualism will be tied up with how one evaluates mereological
nihilism, since the most popular arguments against substance dualism all
have parallel arguments against composition. Another interesting upshot of
all of this is, again, that you should probably not endorse the CPO. The
CPO only works if substance dualism is false (that substance dualism is false
is a presupposition of the argument), and if composition occurs (this is the
conclusion of the argument). But those arguments which are most likely
to lead you to reject substance dualism can, with minor modifications, be
transformed into objections to composition.
Here is a final issue. I’ve argued that every popular objection to dualism
has a parallel objection to composition. Given that dualism is unpopular
because of these sorts of objections, why is composition not similarly unpop-
ular? I have two things to say on this subject.
First, the parallels between objections to substance dualism and objec-
tions to composition have, for the most part, been overlooked.
Second, most people think we have a strong positive case to make for
composition, while we do not have a similarly strong case to make for the
existence or causal efficacy of immaterial souls. I don’t have the space here
to examine positive arguments for composition (or, for that matter, positive
arguments for substance dualism). Let me register my conviction, however,
that such arguments are generally very weak. The most popular defenses of
composition rely on appeals to “common sense,” widespread belief in compo-
sition (the consensus gentium argument for composition), alleged perception
of composite objects, phenomenal conservatism, and the fact that belief in
composition is more “intuitive” than nihilism. These seem to me to be fairly
weak grounds for belief in composition, and ironically enough almost all of
these arguments could be marshaled in service of substance dualism. Argu-
ments for composition on the basis of its role in science are more defensible,
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but, I think, ultimately unsuccessful, although that is a topic for another
occasion (see Brenner forthcoming).28
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